I explain my conception of ideology here. In this section, I make use of {themes} in a few places. These are introduced in my page Introduction to {theme} theory.
'Ideology' derives from the Greek λόγος and ἰδέα. Liddell and Scott give three basic meanings for ἰδέα in the Greek Lexicon, (1) form (2) semblance, opposed to reality (3) notion, idea. The third is taken to be the meaning applicable in 'ideology,' but an ideology makes use of the second meaning. Liddell and Scott include an interesting illustration for this second meaning, from Theognis: γνώμην ἐξαπατῶσ’ ἰδέαι 'Outward appearances cheat the mind.'
Of course, etymology isn't a reliable guide to meaning, or the range of meanings in the case of a complex term.
A number of disparate conceptions of ideology have been employed since the term 'idéologie' was coined by Destutt de Tracy in 1796. He envisaged ideology as a general science of ideas, their components and relations - or {linkages}, as I would term it.
The word ideology is predominantly given a normative meaning now. An important stage in the transition to a normative meaning occurred in the 1840's. Marx and Engels in 'The German Ideology,' ('Die deutsche Ideologie'), criticized the Young Hegelians. Their view, it was claimed, regarded ideas as 'autonomous and efficacious' and failed to grasp 'the real conditions and characteristics of socio-historical life.'
Karl Popper regarded Marxism, and the views of Freud and Adler, as pseudo-scientific. His account in Chapter 1 of 'Conjectures and Refutations' has great importance in the study of ideology. The book's index reference to this material is 'total ideology.' I don't endorse in its entirety his view of Freud and Adler. I regard his criticism of Marxism as valid. I don't provide amplification here.
From Introduction to {theme} theory:
Expansion brackets are useful for the process I call
'amplification.' A writer who is pursuing a main argument will sometimes
make claims or comments or provide evidence which amount to a brief mention,
without any attempt to substantiate the claim or comment or to explain such
matters as the degree of reliability of the evidence. Very often, it would
be impractical to do so. It is not always possible to present every aspect
of an argument thoroughly.
Popper writes,
'I found that those of my friends who were admirers of Marx, Freud, and Adler, were impressed by a number of points common to these theories, and especially by their apparent explanatory power. These theories appeared to be able to explain practically everything that happened within the fields to which they referred. The study of any of them seemed to have the effect of an intellectual conversion or revelation, opening your eyes to a new truth hidden from those not yet initiated. Once you eyes were thus opened you saw confirming instances everywhere: the world was full of verifications of the theory. Whatever happened always confirmed it. Thus its truth appeared manifest; and unbelievers were clearly people who did not want to see the manifest truth; who refused to see it, either because it was against their class interest, or because of their repressions which were still 'un-analysed' and crying out for treatment.'
All of the criticism here is applicable to the feminist views I criticize, although the 'unbelievers,' of course, are the non-feminists who refuse to see 'the manifest truth' because it was against their gender interest, as males, or because of some deep-seated psychological conditions. Feminist 'consciousness-raising,' when successful, is held to open the eyes of the woman (or man), who now sees confirming instances everywhere of the deadly effects of patriarchy and the truth of feminism. The world is full of verifications of feminist theory. Women who act in non-feminist and anti-feminist ways, for example, are held not to falsify the theory. Their behaviour is due to the malign influence of patriarchy.
Popper adds, 'A Marxist could not open a newspaper without finding on every page confirming evidence for his interpretation of history.' The corresponding feminist will find confirming evidence for an interpretation which finds 'sexism,' not perhaps everywhere, but permeating so many areas of reality, including personal, social, historical and economic reality.
In Chapter 9 of 'Unended Quest,' he explains the development of his thought during an early period of his life: 'I developed further my ideas about the demarcation between scientific theories (like Einstein's) and pseudoscientific theories (like Marx's, Freud's, and Adlers). It became clear to me that what made a theory, or a statement, scientific was its power to rule out, or exclude, the occurrence of some possible events ...' This is the concept of falsification which he elaborated in 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery' ('Die Logic der Forschung.')
Falsification is a concept which has very great importance in the study of philosophy of science but its applicability to the study of ideology, including the ideology - as I see it - of feminism hasn't been adequately explored. I introduce two technical terms which I think are useful in discussions of falsification and attempts to falsify: 'falsificans,' the falsifying arguments and evidence, and 'falsificandum,' the application-sphere of the falsificans. The falsificandum is more general than scientific subject-matter. An ideological falsificandum is, however, falsified less conclusively than a scientific falsificandum.
The two terms, like the word 'falsify,' come from late Latin 'falsificare,' from 'falsus' and facere. They have a linkage with the established terms 'explanans' and 'explanandum,' from 'explanare.' Carl Gustav Hempel and Paul Oppenheim proposed a deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation (not given expansion here):
' ... the event under discussion is explained by subsuming it under
general laws, i.e., by showing that it occurred in accordance with those
laws, by virtue of the realization of certain specified antecedent
conditions' and 'By the explanandum, we
understand the sentence describing the phenomenon to be explained (not that
phenomenon itself); by the explanans, the
class of those sentences which are adduced to account for the phenomenon.'
('Studies in the Logic of Explanation,' 'Philosophy of Science,' XV, p.
152.)
Popper's concept has been criticized by a number of philosophers. One of them is the Australian philosopher David Stove, who was strongly anti-feminist. Some limitations of David Stove's approach have been very well explored by Patrícia Lança in her article.
David Stove against Darwin and Popper: The Perils of Showmanship. (Originally published in 'The Salisbury Review,' Summer 2001.) I don't include her discussion of David Stove's criticisms of Darwin and Darwinism, but I do include her brief, critical, mention of feminism and her criticism of relativism. Many feminists include science in their relativistic views. What she has to say about the manner of criticism is very important for critics of feminism, although I favour a mixture of styles, including ridiculing the ridiculous. She writes:
'THERE IS ALWAYS something immediately enjoyable about watching,
listening to or reading apparently outrageous attacks on received
opinion. Reductio ad absurdum is, after all, a time-honoured trick of
rhetoric. The attempted dictatorship of 'political correctness' nowadays
makes the trick even more liable to work. According to those who
listened to the lectures of the Australian philosopher David Stove, he
was a virtuoso in the genre. Professor Michael Levin says: 'Reading
Stove is like watching Fred Astaire dance. You don't wish you were Fred
Astaire, you are just glad to have been around to see him in action'.
'There is, however, a problem with ridicule, especially if we
ourselves have our own reasons for not liking its victims. It is liable
to obscure solid grounds for criticism and play into the camp of the
adversary by providing facile, spurious or distorted arguments. This
would seem to be the case with some of Stove's writing as exemplified in
the two books under review. Not that he isn't worth reading. His
provocative style is such as to make many readers stop, think and
re-examine their own preconceptions. On the other hand, those unfamiliar
with the subject matter, especially among the younger generation, are
likely to be seriously misled about some of his targets and to mistake
rhetoric for serious argument.. Stove, who died in 1994, was a
conservative, an anti-communist and desperately at odds with the
fashionable Left-wing views prevalent in the academy ...
[On his criticism of Popper]
'It is not easy here to produce
a rebuttal of the required brevity or to embark on a boringly technical
argument for and against Popper's epistemology, but justice does require
some attempt to be made. It must first be stated quite unequivocally
that certain of Popper's epistemological positions, once widely
accepted, have in recent years come under forceful criticism from many
quarters ... Nevertheless it is one thing to criticize and quite another
to misrepresent.
...
'It is indeed ironic that the
anti-communist Stove should find Popper so objectionable when there is
probably no academic figure in the last half century who has done as
much to combat their common enemy. In fact on many matters Stove and
Popper were on the same side. Against irrationalism and relativism,
against Freud, against philosophical idealism, against scepticism,
critical of some aspects of Darwinism, and, much else.
'So,
Popper concluded, scientific laws are not immutable but are always
hypotheses. All you can have are better or worse theories and the
scientist's work is to produce ever-better theories. The only logically
and practically acceptable way to do this is to try to falsify your
theory by appropriate testing: the method of trial and error. This,
Popper says, is what scientists actually do in real life. Scientific
method is basically one of testing, making public and criticizing.
Failed theories are abandoned and the search begins again, either by
trimming or adapting the old theory or formulating a new one. So a good
scientific theory should be framed in such a way that it is testable, in
other words falsifiable. If this is not the case then the theory is
neither a good theory nor even a scientific theory.
'Demarcating
science
Popper was interested in finding a criterion for demarcating
science from non-science and he concluded that such theories as Marxism,
Freudianism or astrology do not meet the criteria required of a
genuinely scientific theory. They are couched in such broad terms that
they are invulnerable to falsification. Whatever happens their
proponents regard them as either corroborated or unfalsified. They are
theories against which no arguments or criticisms can count.
'Whatever the justice of his views on induction, Popper's conception of
falsifiability proved a rich field and he mined it for theories in the
realm of his other passion: politics and social questions.. Having
thrown out positive corroboration as crucial in favour of its negative,
namely falsifiability, and having made criticism the essential method
for this, he proposed a similar approach in the political and social
spheres. The aim of government, of the State, should never be the
positive one of trying to make people happy, a quite impossible aim.
Happiness is a private matter and conceived of differently by each
individual. On the contrary the only feasible objective of government is
the negative one of reducing misery. Suffering, starvation, disease and
the rest are objective, public and measurable and it is the State's job
to try to minimize them because the only justification for the existence
of government is the protection of the citizen. To this end freedom to
criticize, to discuss and debate solutions is essential. So for Popper
democracy means freedom of criticism and institutional arrangements that
provide for the removal of unsatisfactory rulers without bloodshed. He
deduced from this position the enormous importance of institutions and
an institutional tradition, of gradual reform as against revolution, and
wrote and lectured widely on these subjects, declaring untiringly that
the political systems of Britain, America, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand were the best models so far known.
'Popper’s philosophy
of science
Now none of this can be unacceptable to a reasonable
person, least of all to a conservative. What has stuck in the throat of
many people is that Popper makes his anti-inductivism bear too much
weight. To deny the possibility of inductive knowledge is to fly in the
face of everybody's everyday experience, including that of our dogs,
cats and most other sentient beings. If we did not start by assuming
regularities and their more or less indefinite replication none of us
would survive for a moment. Indeed, we would be unable to learn anything
at all. It would seem, in fact, that all of us, including animals, have
an innate predisposition to use induction. Popper did not accept this:
he thought that what is innate is the predisposition towards using
methods of trial and error. However, to object to induction on the
grounds that it does not use the rules of entailment of deductive logic,
is to extend the criteria of formal systems and mathematics beyond what
is appropriate. Deductive logic is one thing, inductive logic is another
and their modes of justification are distinct. In science both logics
would appear to have their place. Indeed in the areas of logic and
epistemology we can find an ever-growing literature in which even
deductive logic is questioned and alternative logics proposed.
'Popper's great contribution to the philosophy of science was to
highlight the importance for good theorizing of the need for clear
articulation so that it is immediately, or as immediately as possible,
apparent what would be the conditions for falsification. Such procedure
is both practically and intellectually economical and nurtures the
critical approach and in no way encourages relativism.
'Stove
will have none of this. In a dizzying dithyramb he inveighs against
Popper, not only ignoring his closely woven arguments, but accusing him
of such crimes as denying the accumulation of scientific knowledge, of
irrationalism and of self-contradiction. The aim of science in Popper's
view, Stove alleges, is not to seek truth but to find untruth. Popper's
insistence on the provisional nature of scientific theories, on what he
calls 'conjectural knowledge' is regarded by Stove as irrational in the
extreme. Popper, in effect, denies the accumulation of scientific
knowledge because, if it is all provisional, then it cannot be
knowledge. Knowledge, for Stove, always means knowledge of the truth,
and truth cannot bear the adjective 'conjectural' (as though truth were
absolute). He implies that to talk about 'conjectural truth' is rather
like talking about somebody being 'a little bit pregnant'. So the
concept of 'conjectural knowledge' is a nonsense, a contradiction in
terms and meaningless, and leads to the denial of objective truth found
in the relativists. Stove makes much of this with his usual darting wit.
But his objections are unconvincing. Without entering into the sorely
disputed question (among philosophers) of what constitutes truth it
seems no more unreasonable to talk of 'conjectural knowledge' than to
talk of 'partial knowledge', which everybody does without batting an
eyelid. All Popper means by 'conjectural knowledge', is 'the knowledge
we have so far on the basis of our unfalsified theories', that is, those
theories which when tested are found to have verisimilitude with
empirical facts. This is something we hear every day when we are told
about 'the present state of knowledge'. So the proposition that absolute
truth is unattainable does not entail relativism and, indeed, seems
undeniable to most people.
'That Popper believed fiercely in
objective truth (in its non-absolute sense) is evidenced from his
constant stress that the job of the scientist is the quest for truth. He
also thought that this was an unending quest, for our ignorance is
infinite before the infinity of what is to be known and the finite
nature of our knowledge. This is not the place to examine Popper's
somewhat bizarre theory of 'epistemology without a knowing subject',
what he called World Three, that mysterious sphere in which are stored
books and all man's artefacts, but any serious study of this shows just
how much Popper believed in the objectivity of knowledge.
'So,
because of his misreading, Stove sees Popper as the ultimate progenitor
of the real irrationalists including the unspeakable Feyerabend whose
relativism led him quite openly to declare that schoolchildren should be
taught astrology and myth as equally valid explanations of the world
along with science. Popper's frequent and extended criticism of these
attitudes is regarded by Stove as mere quarrelling between inmates of
the same stable. He totally ignores the historical fact that the actual
forerunners of relativism in philosophy of science were the sociologists
of knowledge going back to Mannheim, examined and combatted by Popper
himself in many writings. Today, of course, relativism in science
studies, rather than coming mainly from Stove's three musketeers has
sadly been given a new boost by philosophers of cognitive science in
conjunction with artificial intelligence theory such as Stitch, the
Churchlands and their disciples.
'Those who wish to have a more
informed and balanced view of Popper's ideas would do well to read
Anthony O'Hear or Susan Haack. The latter should be of especial interest
also to adversaries of all forms of relativism, gender feminism and the
corruption of the academy.
'For anyone acquainted with what
Popper actually wrote, Stove's wholesale condemnation, can only be
regarded as dogmatic and unjust. This is serious because in the present
academic atmosphere of relativism, irrationalism and sub-marxism, there
could be no better antidote for today's students than to read what
Popper has to say about these matters.
'Reading Stove's opinions
about him will do little to encourage them in this direction. The
trouble is, as indicated at the beginning of these comments, that
Stove's style is frequently so engaging and humorous that many readers
will be taken in.'
Popper's account of 'pseudo-scientific' theories is a suitable starting point in explaining my own view of ideology. I regard the concept of falsification as important in demarcation, although not the demarcation which Popper employs. The demarcation here is demarcation between two non-scientific interpretations, ideological and non-ideological. I replace 'demarcation' with the {thematic} operation of {separation}, symbol '//' which has material as well as non-material application-spheres. As my concern on this page is feminism rather than Marxism, I give no account of my reasons for thinking that Marxism is ideological, or the views of Freud and Adler.
Outside science, falsifiability has a legitimate use in deciding which views to do with human nature, human achievement, and other aspects of humanity - I'll refer to 'human studies' - are securely grounded or the product of ideological distortion. If the distinctive conclusiveness of scientific falsification is lacking, the claim that an argument has been falsified may have great cogency, the argument that an argument has withstood the process of testing far less cogency. 'People are benign' is a statement which can't be tested, or falsified, by the methods of science, but it can be tested, and falsified, to a high degree of probability, by non-scientific methods. 'Women are benign' is a statement which can be tested and falsified too.
Facts are used differently in ideological and non-ideological theories and views. Facts in non-ideological theories and views may often be problematic but they are assessed by using independent methods and techniques, such as comparison of source materials, avoidance of demonstrably unreliable witnesses.
Facts in ideological theories and views avoid the use of methods and techniques external to the ideology. Ideological theories and views are based on the distinction between appearance and reality. Facts belong to the world of appearance, which is regarded as illusory. Facts which are demonstrably true, passing the most thorough and comprehensive tests, belong only to this world of appearance if they conflict with facts which support the ideology. If not in conflict, they are admitted to the world of reality.
It's essential to distinguish between facts and the explanation for those facts, the context of those facts. The sphere of facts, although far from straightforward, is much simpler than the sphere of explanations and context. I don't accept that facts are themselves interpretations, that there aren't many, many well-grounded facts in human studies.
A feminist could claim that the generalization 'all women lack serious vices' (without {restriction} to sexual vice, of course) should be considered in context, which supplies a cause. The many women who could be cited as counter-examples, the women who obviously have serious vices, are so on account of the manipulation and control exercised by men. A wide variety of other claims about women which seem to challenge feminist views could be countered in a similar way. The feminist would then have to explain, or explain away, the unflattering view of many women which is required here - women as weak and malleable.
If X is the subject matter - class in society, women in history or whatever may be treated in an ideological or non-ideological way - then the crucial difference is that the ideological and the non-ideological way are different in the reasons for {modification} and the use of counter arguments and contrary evidence. {modification} has /{revision}, an example of a 'specific' {theme}, with {restriction}:- general applicability, and the capacity for /{revision} is the term in non-thematic form 'revisability.' Revisability is common to scientific theory and a non-scientific theory, as well as, more loosely, a 'view,' which is non-ideological. {modification}:- [ideological theory or view] has as agents not counter arguments and contrary evidence but, as examples, the forces which change an ideology and give it different forms, perhaps as a result of the very different social contexts in which the ideology is found. Similarly, the language in which an ideology is expressed may develop different 'dialects,' for similar reasons.
An ideology may exhibit drastic and abrupt {modification}, as in the case of the communist supporters who abandoned criticism of Nazi Germany, but this was not as a result of counter arguments and contrary evidence but the fact that Soviet Russia entered into a pact with Nazi Germany at Stalin's instigation.
If counter arguments and contrary evidence lead in all cases to no, or practically no, /{revision} of a theory or view, then the theory or view is likely to be ideological.
/{revision} of a non-ideological theory or view, like /{revision} of a scientific theory, allows of quantitative differences. The most drastic form is abandonment. Of course, there may be abandonment of an ideological theory or view, as in the case of communists who became non-communists. Counter arguments and contrary evidence of value may be rejected for a time but eventually have an effect.
'The God That Failed,' published in 1949 book, contains six essays by prominent writers and journalists who decame disillusioned with communism and abandoned it. The six were Louis Fischer, André Gide, Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, Stephen Spender and Richard Wright.
A critique of a possible feminist defence is only given in outline here. On this page, as in so much of the site, evidence and argument is often given in a dispersed form. I examine feminist arguments in many places on this page and there are many places in other pages of the site where material can be found which has relevance to this page.
I see the need not to confine attention to the arguments and evidence but to the factors which may prevent the arguments and evidence from being understood or appreciated. This is particularly necessary when considering the totalitarian ideologies, above all Stalinism and Nazism, the subject of Hannah Arendt's 'The Origins of Totalitarianism,' in three parts. Evidence may require insight and sometimes empathy to appreciate. Hannah Arendt could obviously enter the world of totalitarian ideology. She possessed a a far deeper degree of distinctively personal insight, over a far wider range, than, say, Karl Popper. Intellectuality of very great distinction, such as he possessed, can probe some things far more effectively than others.
In the last chapter of the third volume of 'The Origins of Totalitarianism,' significantly entitled 'Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government,' she gives, too late in the book, it has to be said, a formulation of ideology. The formulation isn't a good one: 'Ideologies - isms which to the satisfaction of their adherents can explain everything and every occurrence by deducing it from a single premise - are a very recent phenomenon and, for many decades, played a negligible role in political life.' No ideology explains everything or every occurrence. This is much too wide a claim. Ideologists don't claim to explain, for instance, most natural phenomena. The use of the logical term 'premise' isn't appropriate, and ideological explanations and directives may be derived from a small number of basic beliefs, not necessarily a single one.
Hannah Arendt elicits very different responses. Two very different responses, those of David Satter and Bernard Wasserstein, are given in an excellent Symposium: Is Hannah Arendt still relevant? I very much believe that she is.
In general, ideologists see no need to defend a thesis against the arguments and evidence which comprise a legitimate anti-thesis. The reference to 'ideology' can be removed, since the claim that the thesis is ideological is often part of the claim of the anti-thesis. I think that these terms 'thesis' and 'anti-thesis' are useful in examining the reaction of feminists to criticisms, and their lack of reaction.
The evidence and arguments put forward by opponents of feminism amount to a substantial case to answer, surely, and I claim to have added to the evidence and arguments. I think that the thesis is substantial but that the anti-thesis is far from substantial.
Argument and the presentation of evidence and the giving of counter-argument and counter-evidence are of fundamental importance and my terms 'thesis' and 'anti-thesis' express these necessities of debate concisely. If the views often summarized as 'political correctness' seem to avoid debate on these terms, it's cause for particular alarm that this is so often the case in universities and colleges.
Thesis can become anti-thesis and anti-thesis can
become thesis. If a feminist criticizes the arguments I use and denies that
the evidence I put forward is convincing, then this anti-thesis becomes the
thesis which it is for me to answer as an anti-thesis.
It's possible that a
synthesis will emerge from the contending thesis and anti-thesis, but often
this is not the case.
When a very powerful thesis - one with very strong arguments and accompanied by very strong evidence - is challenged by an anti-thesis which has neither, a synthesis is very unlikely. In this case, I use the simple symbolism (thesis) >> (anti-thesis). If the anti-thesis is better supported, then (thesis) > (anti-thesis).
This simple scheme, using this simple pair of terms, has to be supplemented and extended when there are more than two opposing viewpoints, but it can often be used if single aspects are the focus of attention: this is to practise {resolution}. Often, a practical decision is the issue. A measure may become law or not and there may be support for the change in law or opposition to the change.
Supporters of the status quo and opponents of the status quo may have various reasons and may supply different arguments and evidence but the decision may well be a clear-cut one. Support for the status quo is the thesis and opposition to the status quo is the anti-thesis. All that is needed is to distinguish the diverging views which make up the composite thesis and anti-thesis.
